


## Distributed 2-approximation algorithm for Vertex Cover

Christos Koufogiannakis and Neal E.Young University of California, Riverside








# A sequential 2-approximation algorithm

"Edge discount" ---


reduce edge endpoints' costs equally.

Do edge discounts until zero-cost nodes form a cover. Return the cover formed by the zero-cost nodes.


[Bar-Yehuda and Even, 1981]




#### Reduce both endpoints' costs equally.





### Reduce both endpoints' costs equally.





Reduce both endpoints' costs equally.


















**theorem:** cost(C) is at most **twice** the minimum possible cost.

#### proof:


Show (i) cost(C) is at most twice the sum of the discounts. (ii) The sum of the discounts is at most the optimal cost.



**step (i):** Cost(C) is at most twice the sum of the discounts.

proof:


$$\sum_{v \in C} \operatorname{cost}(v) = \sum_{v \in C} \sum_{e \sim v} \operatorname{discount}(e) \leq \sum_{e \in E} 2 \operatorname{discount}(e)$$



step (ii): Optimal cost is at least the sum of the discounts.

proof:

$$\sum_{v \in \text{OPT}} \text{cost}(v) \ge \sum_{v \in \text{OPT}} \sum_{e \sim v} \text{discount}(e) \ge \sum_{e \in E} \text{discount}(e)$$



theorem: cost(C) is at most **twice** the minimum possible cost.

proof:

(i) cost(C) is at most twice the sum of the discounts.
(ii) The sum of the discounts is at most the optimal cost.

## next: fast distributed implementation of BY&E algorithm



### each node knows only its neighbors




Tuesday, February 5, 13

## distributed computation

- Proceed in rounds.
- In each round:

Each node exchanges O(I) messages with immediate neighbors, then does some computation.

goal: Finish in a small (logarithmic) number of rounds.



- I. form independent rooted "stars"
- 2. coordinate discounts within stars

Done when zero-cost vertices cover all edges.

goal: Done after  $O(\log n)$  rounds (n = #nodes).


### how to form stars

 Each node randomly chooses to be "boy" or "girl" (just for this round).

- For the round, use only edges from boys to higher-cost (or equal-cost) girls. (Pretend other edges don't exist.)<sup>†</sup>
- 3. Each boy chooses a random neighbor (girl of  $\geq$  cost).


<sup>†</sup> In each round, every edge has a one in four chance of being used. (... will be used if low-cost endpoint is boy, high-cost endpoint is girl) How to form stars:


- I. Each node randomly chooses to be "boy" or "girl".
- 2. For the round, use only edges from boys to higher-cost (or equal-cost) girls. (Pretend other edges don't exist.)
- 3. Each boy chooses a random neighbor (girl of  $\geq$  cost).




How to form stars:

- I. Each node randomly chooses to be "boy" or "girl".
- 2. For the round, use only edges from boys to higher-cost (or equal-cost) girls. (Pretend other edges don't exist.)
- 3. Each boy chooses a random neighbor (girl of  $\geq$  cost).







### how girls allocate discounts

• Each girl allocates discounts greedily, in alphabetic order.


▶ If she partially allocates some boy's discount, then...


with probability 1/2:

I. She revokes discounts to all other boys.


2. She allocates full discount to that boy.

Some boys may be *jilted* (have *no chance* for discount).







- Each girl allocates discounts greedily, in alphabetical order.
- If she partially allocates some boy's discount, then... with probability 1/2:
  - I. She revokes discounts to all other boys.
  - 2. She allocates full discount to that boy.




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
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
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


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  - 2. She allocates full discount to that boy.




## each of girl's boys is either:

- jilted (girl gives no chance of any discount)
- not jilted (girl gives at least 50% chance of discount)




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## each of girl's boys is either:

- jilted (girl gives no chance of any discount)
- not jilted (girl gives at least 50% chance of discount)



# recap of algorithm

in each round:

- Each node randomly chooses to be "boy" or "girl".
   Only edges from boys to higher-cost girls are used.
- 2. To form stars, each boy chooses a random neighbor (girl).
- 3. To allocate discounts within stars:

(a) Each girl allocates greedily in alphabetical order.(b) If a boy is partially allocated, with probability 1/2, she gives a full discount to just that boy.

# analysis

- Guaranteed to return a 2-approximate solution, since it implements the edge-discount algorithm.
- What about running time?

**Goal:** Show O(log n) rounds (w.h.p.).

## analysis of number of rounds


• "Delete" edges when one endpoint's cost becomes zero.

**Iemma:** In each round, in expectation,

a constant fraction of each boy's active edges are deleted. proof: (next)

**corollary:** Number of rounds is  $O(\log n^2) = O(\log n)$ in expectation and with high probability.


a constant fraction of each boy's active edges are deleted.



**proof:** Fix any boy.

For the analysis, condition on the random choices of all other boys. (Imagine that the boy chooses his girl *after* every other boy chooses.)


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
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
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
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
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**proof:** Fix any boy.

For the analysis, condition on the random choices of all other boys. (Imagine that the boy chooses his girl *after* every other boy chooses.)

a constant fraction of **each boy's** active edges are deleted.



key observation:

girl would jilt boy  $\Rightarrow$  her cost is going to zero regardless of what boy does.


girl would not jilt boy  $\Rightarrow$  if boy chooses her,

she has at least a 50% chance of zeroing boy's cost...

key observation:

girl would jilt boy  $\Rightarrow$  her cost is going to zero regardless of what boy does. girl would not jilt boy  $\Rightarrow$  if boy chooses her,

she has at least a 50% chance of zeroing boy's cost...



case (i): At least half of boy's girls would jilt him.

 $\Rightarrow$  At least half of boy's edges will be deleted regardless of what boy does.

#### case (ii): At least half of boy's girls would not jilt him.

⇒ Boy has at least a 50% chance of choosing a girl who has at least a 50% chance of zeroing his cost (deleting all his edges).

# thank you

