

CS 250 Software Security

Program Hardening



Efficient Software-Based Fault Isolation

ACM SIGOPS 1993


Why do we need SFI?



- Use protection domains to isolate untrusted components
 - A web browser should isolate browser plugins
 - An OS should isolate device drivers
- Designate a memory region for an untrusted component and instrument dangerous instructions in it to constrain its memory access and control transfer
- Highly desirable to isolate untrusted components in separate protection domains, grant them minimum privileges

	Context- switch overhead	Per-instruction overhead	Com- piler support	Software engineering effort	
Virtual machines	very high	none	no	none	
OS processes	high	none	no	none	
Language- based isolation	low	medium (dynamic) or none (static)	yes high		
SFI	low	low	maybe	none or medium	

SFI Policy




- A data region hols all data needed by the code
- A code region where code is loaded into
- A set of safe external code addresses
- Three regions are mutually disjoint
- Data-access policy: All memory reads and writes by the code should be within the data region
- Control-flow policy: A control transfer by the code must stay within the code or target a safe external address


SFI Enforcement



(a) Dynamic binary translation



(b) Inlined reference monitors



Implementing IRM Rewriters



- > Binary-rewriting
 - > Does not require source code
 - > Disassembling binaries without metadata can be challenging
 - Optimizing checks in binaries is challenging
- Compiler-based instrumentation
 - > Requires access to source code
 - > Perform more precise static analysis for optimizing checks
 - Portable across architectures

Enforcing the Data-Access Policy



- A naïve implementation can insert checks before all memory instructions
 - Mem(r1 + 12) := r2 →

```
r10 := r1 + 12
if (r10 < DB) goto error
if (r10 > DL) goto error
mem(r10) := r2
```

- > Too much runtime overhead
- Need optimizations

Data Region Specialization



- > Make all addresses have the same upper bits.
 - > These upper bits are called the data region ID.

```
mem(r1 + 12) := r2 →
```

```
r10 := r1 + 12
r11 := r10 >> 16
if (r11 6= 0x1234) goto error
mem(r10) := r2
```

 A right-shift instruction in more efficient than a conditional jump

Integrity-only Isolation



- > A typical perform performs more memory reads than writes
- To ensure the integrity of memory outside the data region, we only need to check memory writes
- So, this weakened policy leads to much lower runtime overhead

Address Masking



- > Force an address to be inside the data region
 - > "mem(r1 + 12) := r2" →

```
r10 := r1 + 12
r10 := r10 & 0x0000FFFF
r10 := r10 | 0x12340000
mem(r10) := r2
```

- > PittSFleId further fixes the data region ID to have only one single bit on
 - > r10 := r1 + 12 r10 := r10 & 0x2000FFFF mem(r10) := r2

Enforcing the Control-Flow Policy



- Control transfers by the sandboxed code must stay in the code region or target a safe external address
- > One solution: A dedicated register is used to hold the jump target
- Strengthened control-flow policy
 - > All control-flow transfers must target the beginning of a pseudo instruction in the code or target a safe external address.
 - > Fine-grained CFI (will be discussed later)
 - > Aligned-chunk enforcement (PittSFIeld)




Figure 3.5: Illustration of the aligned-chunk enforcement. Black-filled rectangles represent regular (non-dangerous) instructions. Rectangles with "dang. ins" represent dangerous instructions, which are preceded by guards. For alignment, no-op instructions have to be inserted. Furthermore, call instructions are placed at the end of chunks since return addresses must be aligned.

Interaction with the Outside World



- > A list of predefined APIs that sandboxed code can call
- > A deep copy of arguments (also called marshalling)



Control-Flow Integrity

ACM CCS 2005

CFI: Control-Flow Integrity



- Main idea: pre-determine control flow graph (CFG) of an application
 - > Static analysis of source code
 - Static binary analysis ← CFI
 - > Execution profiling
 - Explicit specification of security policy
- > Execution must follow the pre-determined control flow graph

CFI: Binary Instrumentation




- Use binary rewriting to instrument code with runtime checks (similar to SFI)
- Inserted checks ensure that the execution always stays within the statically determined CFG
 - Whenever an instruction transfers control, destination must be valid according to the CFG
- Goal: prevent injection of arbitrary code and invalid control transfers (e.g., return-to-libc)
 - Secure even if the attacker has complete control over the thread's address space

CFG Example



```
bool lt(int x, int y) {
    return x < y;
}
bool gt(int x, int y) {
    return x > y;
}
sort2(int a[], int b[], int len)
{
    sort( a, len, lt );
    sort( b, len, gt );
}
```



CFI: Control Flow Enforcement



- For each control transfer, determine statically its possible destination(s)
- Insert a unique bit pattern at every destination
 - Two destinations are equivalent if CFG contains edges to each from the same source
 - This is imprecise (why?)
 - > Use same bit pattern for equivalent destinations
- Insert binary code that at runtime will check whether the bit pattern of the target instruction matches the pattern of possible destinations


CFI: Example of Instrumentation



Original code

Opcode bytes Instructions			Destination Opcode bytes Instructions		
FF E1	jmp ecx	; computed jump	8B 44 24 04	mov eax, [esp+4]	; dst

Instrumented code



CFI: Preventing Circumvention



- > Unique IDs
 - Bit patterns chosen as destination IDs must not appear anywhere else in the code memory except ID checks
- Non-writable code
 - > Program should not modify code memory at runtime
 - > What about run-time code generation and self-modification?
- Non-executable data
 - > Program should not execute data as if it were code
- Enforcement: hardware support + prohibit system calls that change protection state + verification at load-time

Improving CFI Precision



- Suppose a call from A goes to C, and a call from B goes to either C, or D (when can this happen?)
 - CFI will use the same tag for C and D, but this allows an "invalid" call from A to D
 - > Possible solution: duplicate code or inline
 - Possible solution: multiple tags
- Function F is called first from A, then from B; what's a valid destination for its return?
 - CFI will use the same tag for both call sites, but this allows F to return to B after being called from A
 - Solution: shadow call stack

CFI: Security Guarantees



- Effective against attacks based on illegitimate control-flow transfer
 - Stack-based buffer overflow, return-to-libc exploits, pointer subterfuge
- Does <u>not</u> protect against attacks that do not violate the program's original CFG
 - Incorrect arguments to system calls
 - Substitution of file names
 - > Other data-only attacks

Performance Overhead




Figure 4: Execution overhead of inlined CFI enforcement on SPEC2000 benchmarks.

Performance Overhead (2)






Figure 8: Enforcement overhead for CFI with a protected shadow call stack on SPEC2000 benchmarks.

What's more?



- > Write-Integrity Testing (WIT): S&P 2008
 - For each memory write, pointer analysis is employed to compute the approximate set of objects that can be written by the memory write. At runtime, write sets are remembered by a color table and dynamic checks are used to prevent a memory write to change objects outside its write set.
- > Data-Flow Integrity (DFI): OSDI 2006
 - DFI inserts checks before memory reads and writes to enforce the runtime data flow is compliant with the Data Flow Graph (DFG)
- Memory Safety
 - > SoftBound (PLDI 2009): enforce spatial memory safety
 - > CETS (ISMM 2010): enforce temporal memory safety
 - > CCured (POPL 2002): combines type inference and runtime checking
- Code Pointer Integrity (CPI): OSDI 2014
 - > CPI guarantees the integrity of all code pointers in a program