


# **Advanced Operating Systems** (CS 202)


# **Extensible Operating Systems**














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#### **Summary**

- > DOS-like structure:
  - good performance and extensibility
  - Bad protection
- > Monolithic kernels:
  - Good performance and protection
  - Bad extensibility
- Microkernels
  - Good protection and extensibility
  - Bad performance!

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#### How do we address extensibility nowadays?

- > Device Drivers
- > Browser Plugins Extensions
- Language Runtime (e.g., JavaScript)
- Software Fault Isolation

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#### What should an extensible OS do?

- > It should be thin, like a micro-kernel
  - > Only mechanisms (or even less?)
  - no policies; they are defined by extensions
- > Fast access to resources, like DOS
  - Eliminate border crossings
- Flexibility without sacrificing protection or performance
- Basically, fast, protected and flexible

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## **Spin Approach to extensibility**

- > Co-location of kernel and extension
  - Avoid border crossings
  - > But what about protection?
- Language/compiler forced protection
  - Strongly typed language
    - > Protection by compiler and run-time
    - Cannot cheat using pointers
  - Logical protection domains
    - No longer rely on hardware address spaces to enforce protection – no boarder crossings
- > Dynamic call binding for extensibility

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# SPIN mechanisms/Toolbox

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# **Logical protection domains**

- Modula-3 safety and encapsulation mechanisms
  - Type safety, automatic storage management
  - > Objects, threads, exceptions and generic interfaces
- Fine-grained protection of objects using capabilities. An object can be:
  - Hardware resources (e.g., page frames)
  - Interfaces (e.g., page allocation module)
  - Collection of interfaces (e.g., full VM)
- Capabilities are language supported pointers

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#### Logical protecti INTERFACE DOMAIN;

TYPE T <: REFANY; (\* Domain.T is opaque \*)

> Create:

PROCEDURE Create(coff:CoffFile.T):T;

(\* Returns a domain created from the specified object file (''coff'' is a standard object file format). \*)

Resolve:

PROCEDURE CreateFromModule():T;
(\* Create a domain containing interfaces defined by the calling module. This function allows modules to name and export themselves at runtime. \*) Names are resc (\* Resolve any undefined symbols in the target domain against any exported symbols from the source.\*)

Once resolved

PROCEDURE Combine(d1, d2: T):T;
(\* Create a new aggregate domain that exports the interfaces of the given domains. \*)

Combine

END Domain.

- To create an aggregate domain
- This is the key to spin protection, extensibility and performance

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
#### **Protection Model (I)**

- All kernel resources are referenced by capabilities [tickets]
- > SPIN implements capabilities directly through the use of pointers
- > Compiler prevents pointers to be forged or dereferenced in a way inconsistent with its type at compile time:
  - No run time overhead for using a pointer

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# **Protection Model (II)**

- A pointer can be passed to a user-level application through an externalized reference:
  - Index into a per-application table of safe references to kernel data structures
- Protection domains define the set of names accessible to a given execution context




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#### **Spin Mechanisms for Events**

- > Spin extension model is based on events and handlers
  - Which provide for communication between the base and the extensions
- > Events are routed by the Spin Dispatcher to handlers
  - Handlers are typically extension code called as a procedure by the dispatcher
  - > One-to-one, one-to-many or many-to-one
    - > All handlers registered to an event are invoked
      - > Guards may be used to control which handler is used







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CPU

INTERFACE Strand;

TYPE T <: REFANY; (* Strand.T is opaque *)

PROCEDURE Block(s:T);
(* Signal to a scheduler that s is not runnable. *)

PROCEDURE Unblock(s: T);
(* Signal to a scheduler that s is runnable. *)

PROCEDURE Checkpoint(s: T);
(* Signal that s is being descheduled and that it should save any processor state required for subsequent rescheduling. *)

PROCEDURE Resume(s: T);
(* Signal that s is being placed on a processor and that it should reschablish any state saved during a prior call to Checkpoint. *)

EVI

**END**

Figure 4: The Strand Interface. This interface describes the scheduling events affecting control flow that can be raised within the kernel.

Application-specific schedulers and thread packages install handlers on these events, which are raised on behalf of particular strands. A trusted thread package and scheduler provide default implementations of these operations, and ensure that extensions do not install handlers on strands for which they do not possess a capability.

**Age

**Age
```

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### **Experiments**

- > Don't worry, I wont go through them
- In the OS community, you have to demonstrate what you are proposing
  - They built SPIN, extensions and applications that use them
  - Focus on performance and size
    - Reasonable size, and substantial performance advantages even relative to a mature monolithic kernel

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#### **Conclusions**

- > Extensibility, protection and performance
- Extensibility and protection provided by language/compiler features and run-time checks
  - Instead of hardware address spaces
  - > ...which gives us performance—no border crossing
- Who are we trusting? Consider application and Spin
- > How does this compare to Exo-kernel?