CS225 – Computer Security


Network Security

slides modified from Zhiyun Qian

History of Network Security

- Initially built for communication between research institutions
 - ARPANET (TCP/IP)
 - First packet sent from UCLA to SRI
- Internet designed without security in mind
 - Including key protocols such as TCP/IP
 - Getting it to work is already an amazing job
- Hard to retrofit security into existing protocols
 - Have to remain backward-compatible
 - E.g., TCP/IP used by every machine now
 - Solutions often are patches or require an additional layer of indirection

How the Internet looks like in 2005




Common network security attacks and their countermeasures

- Packet sniffing and spoofing
 - Encryption (SSH, SSL, HTTPS)
- Finding a way into the network
 - Firewalls
- Denial of Service
 - Ingress filtering, IDS


Quick overview of TCP/IP

• Example:



- Network traffic is broken down into "packets" containing information at 4 main layers Layer 4 : Application
 - Layer 3 : Transport (TCP)
 - Layer 2 : Network (IP)
 - Layer 1 : Link/Physical


TCP/IP network Layers



Headers at higher layers become data at lower layers

Source: IETF RFC 1122

TCP/IP network Layers



Headers at higher layers become data at lower layers

Source: IETF RFC 1122

IP Layer

- Responsible for end to end transmission
- Sends data in individual packets
- Maximum size of packet is determined by the networks
 - Fragmented if too large
- Unreliable
 - Packets might be lost, corrupted, duplicated, delivered out of order

IP addresses

- 4 bytes (IPv4)
 - e.g. 163.1.125.98
 - Each device normally gets one (or more)
 - In theory there are about 4 billion available
- But...
 - Basically used up today
 - Therefore, 16 bytes are now used in IPv6 (still not fully functional today)

Routing

- How does a device know where to send a packet?
 - All devices need to know what IP addresses are on directly attached networks
 - If the destination is on a local network, send it directly there

Routing (cont.)

- If the destination address isn't local
 - Most non-router devices just send everything to a single local router (gateway)
 - Routers need to know which network corresponds to each possible IP address


Allocation of addresses

- Controlled centrally by ICANN
 - Fairly strict rules on further delegation to avoid wastage
 - Have to demonstrate actual need for them
- Organizations that got in early have bigger allocations than they really need

IP packets

- Source and destination addresses
- Protocol number
 - 1 = ICMP, 6 = TCP, 17 = UDP
- Various options
 - e.g. to control fragmentation
- Time to live (TTL)
 - Prevent routing loops

IP Datagram



Field Purpose


Vers IP version number
Len Length of IP header (4 octet units)
TOS Type of Service
T. Length Length of entire datagram (octets)
Ident. IP datagram ID (for frag/reassembly)
Flags Don't/More fragments
Frag Off Fragment Offset

Field Purpose

TTLTime To Live - Max # of hops Protocol Higher level protocol (1=ICMP, 6=TCP, 17=UDP) Checksum Checksum for the IP header Source IA Originator's Internet Address Dest. IAFinal Destination Internet Address Options Source route, time stamp, etc. Data... Higher level protocol data

Problem with IP address


- Source address in a packet can be filled arbitrarily by a host (think of USPS mail)
 - Lack of authentication of packet sources
 - Many vulnerabilities arise because of this



UDP

- Thin layer on top of IP (alternative to TCP)
- Adds packet length + checksum
 - Guard against corrupted packets
- Also source and destination ports
 - Ports are used to associate a packet with a specific application at each end
- Still unreliable:
 - Duplication, loss, out-of-orderness possible

UDP datagram



Field Purpose


Source Port 16-bit port number identifying originating application Destination Port 16-bit port number identifying destination application Length Length of UDP datagram (UDP header + data) Checksum Checksum of IP pseudo header, UDP header, and data

Typical applications of UDP

- Where packet loss etc is better handled by the application than the network stack
- Where the overhead of setting up a TCP connection isn't wanted
- DNS
- VoIP
- Some games


IP Spoofing against UDP

• Need to guess the port number...




DNS Protocol – Application Layer Protocol

 Mapping between domain name (human readable) and IP addresses



DNS Poisoning Attack

• Attacker can spoof its source IP as name server's IP



TCP

- Reliable, full-duplex, connection-oriented, stream delivery
 - Interface presented to the application doesn't require data in individual packets
 - Data is guaranteed to arrive, and in the correct order without duplicates
 - Or the connection will be dropped
 - Imposes significant overheads

Applications of TCP

- Most things!
 HTTP, FTP, SMTP...
- Saves the application a lot of work, so used unless there's a good reason not to


TCP implementation

- Connections are established using a three-way handshake
- Data is divided up into packets by the operating system
- Packets are numbered, and received packets are acknowledged
- Connections are explicitly closed
 - (or may abnormally terminate)

TCP Packets

- Source + destination ports
- Sequence number
- Acknowledgement number
- Checksum
- Various options

TCP Segment



Field	Purpose
	•

Source Port Identifies originating application

Destination Port Identifies destination application

Sequence Number Sequence number of first octet in the segment

Acknowledgment # Sequence number of the next expected octet (if ACK flag set)

Len Length of TCP header in 4 octet units

Flags TCP flags: SYN, FIN, RST, PSH, ACK, URG


Window Number of octets from ACK that sender will accept

Checksum Checksum of IP pseudo-header + TCP header + data

Urgent Pointer Pointer to end of "urgent data"

Options Special TCP options such as MSS and Window Scale

TCP : Data transfer



IP Spoofing against TCP

 Need to guess the port number, sequence number, and acknowledgement number!







TCP header

Common Threat Models in Networks (targeting confidentiality and integrity)


- Passive Eavesdropper
 Read (and at most Insert)
- Man-in-the-middle (MITM)



- <u>On</u> the communication path (compromised router)
- Arbitrary Read/Write capability (modify, drop, etc.)



• Off-Path attacker (no read capability)








Passive Eavesdropper

- Read (at most insert)
- Can an attacker launch DNS poisoning attack?




IP Spoofing against UDP (review)

• Need to guess the port number...




Man-in-the-middle (MITM)

- Arbitrary Read/Write capability (modify, drop, etc.)
- Can an attacker launch DNS poisoning attack?



Off-Path Attacker

- No read. Can insert.
- Can an attacker launch DNS poisoning attack?



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Finding a way into the network --Scanning

Host 192.168.2.1 appears to be up. MAC Address: 00:04:E2:34:B6:CE (SMC Networks) Host 192.168.2.79 appears to be up. MAC Address: 00:11:11:5B:7A:CD (Intel) Host 192.168.2.82 appears to be up. MAC Address: 00:10:5A:0D:F6:D7 (3com) Host 192.168.2.198 appears to be up. MAC Address: 00:10:DC:55:89:27 (Micro-star International) Host 192.168.2.199 appears to be up. MAC Address: 00:C0:4F:36:33:91 (Dell Computer) Host 192.168.2.200 appears to be up. MAC Address: 00:0C:41:22:CC:01 (The Linksys Group) Host 192.168.2.251 appears to be up. MAC Address: 00:0F:66:75:3D:75 (Cisco-Linksys)

Does That Matter?

- The number of computers an organization has roughly corresponds to the number of people in it
- How large is your competitor?
- (How many computers does Google have in its data centers? They won't say.)

Does That Matter?

 If they identify a service that has a known vulnerability (e.g., buffer overflow), they can launch the corresponding exploit

\$ nmap -Pn www.cs.ucr.edu

```
Starting Nmap 6.40 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2015-11-17 20:03 UTC
Nmap scan report for www.cs.ucr.edu (169.235.30.15)
Host is up (0.00033s latency).
rDNS record for 169.235.30.15: thoth.cs.ucr.edu
Not shown: 996 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open ssh
80/tcp open http
111/tcp open rpcbind
5666/tcp open nrpe
```



- Basic problem many network applications and protocols have security problems that are fixed over time
 - Difficult for users to keep up with changes and keep host secure
 - Solution
 - Administrators limit access to end hosts by using a firewall
 - Firewall is kept up-to-date by administrators



- A firewall is like a castle with a drawbridge
 - Only one point of access into the network
 - This can be good or bad
- Can be hardware or software
 - Ex. Some routers come with firewall functionality
 - ipfw, ipchains, pf on Unix systems, Windows XP and Mac OS
 X have built in firewalls



- Used to filter packets based on a combination of features
 - These are called packet filtering firewalls
 - There are other types too, but they will not be discussed
 - Ex. Drop packets with destination port of 23 (Telnet)
 - Can use any combination of IP/UDP/TCP header information
- But why don't we just turn Telnet off?



- Here is what a computer with a default Windows install looks like:
 - 135/tcp open loc-srv
 - 139/tcp open netbios-ssn
 - 445/tcp open microsoft-ds
 - 1025/tcp open NFS-or-IIS
 - 3389/tcp open ms-term-serv
 - 5000/tcp open UPnP


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- Purpose: Make a network service unusable, usually by overloading the server or network
- Many different kinds of DoS attacks
 - SYN flooding
 - SMURF
 - Distributed attacks

TCP Three-way handshake



- SYN flooding attack
- Send SYN packets with bogus source address
 Why?
- Server responds with SYN ACK and keeps state about TCP half-open connection
 - Eventually, server memory is exhausted with this state









- SMURF
 - Source IP address of a broadcast ping is forged
 - Large number of machines respond back to victim, overloading it



- ICMP echo (spoofed source address of victim) Sent to IP broadcast address
 - ICMP echo reply

