

CS 153

Design of Operating Systems

Fall 19

Lecture 12: Advanced Paging

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Some slides modified from originals by Dave O'hallaron

Advanced Paging

- So far we have discussed how to make memory access faster under paging
- Next, we will discuss interesting tricks on using paging (**how those bits in the PTE are used**)
 - ◆ Sharing
 - ◆ Copy-on-Write
 - ◆ Memory mapped file
 - ◆ On-demand mapping
 - ◆ Virtual memory

Core i7 Level 1-3 Page Table Entries

63	62	52	51	12	11	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
XD	Unused	Page table physical base address			Unused	G	PS		A	CD	WT	U/S	R/W	P=1	

Available for OS (page table location on disk)														P=0
--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	-----

P: Child page table present in physical memory (1) or not (0).

R/W: Read-only or read-write access permission for all reachable pages.

U/S: user or supervisor (kernel) mode access permission for all reachable pages.

WT: Write-through or write-back cache policy for the child page table.

CD: Caching disabled or enabled for the child page table.

A: Reference bit (set by MMU on reads and writes, cleared by software).

PS: Page size either 4 KB or 2 MB (defined for Level 1 PTEs only).

G: Global page (don't evict from TLB on task switch)

Page table physical base address: 40 most significant bits of physical page table address (forces page tables to be 4KB aligned)


XD: Non-executable pages

Sharing

- Private virtual address spaces protect applications from each other
 - ◆ Usually exactly what we want
- But this makes it difficult to share data (have to copy)
 - ◆ Parents and children in a forking Web server or proxy will want to share an in-memory cache without copying
- We can use **shared memory** to allow processes to share data using direct memory references
 - ◆ Both processes see updates to the shared memory segment
 - » Process B can immediately read an update by process A

Sharing (2)

- Sharing code and data among processes
 - ◆ Map virtual pages to the same physical page (here: PP 6)



Sharing (3)

- Can map shared memory at same or different virtual addresses in each process' address space
 - ◆ Different:
 - » 10th virtual page in P1 and 7th virtual page in P2 correspond to the 2nd physical page
 - » Flexible (no address space conflicts), but pointers inside the shared memory segment are invalid
 - ◆ Same:
 - » 2nd physical page corresponds to the 10th virtual page in both P1 and P2
 - » Less flexible, but shared pointers are valid

Sharing (4)



- Linux API
 - ◆ Map to different address
 - » `shm_open ()`: create and open a new object, or open an existing object.
 - » `mmap ()`: map the shared memory object into the virtual address space of the calling process.
 - ◆ Map to the same address
 - » `mmap ()`: with `MAP_SHARED`

Copy on Write

- Recall what happens during `fork()`
 - ◆ Entire address spaces needs to be copied
- Use Copy on Write (CoW) to defer large copies as long as possible, hoping to avoid them altogether
 - ◆ Instead of copying pages, create **shared mappings** of parent pages in child virtual address space
 - ◆ Shared pages are protected as **read-only** in parent and child
 - » Reads happen as usual
 - » Writes generate a protection fault, trap to OS, copy page, change page mapping in client page table, restart write instruction



Execution of fork()

Parent process's
page table



Child process's
page table


Physical Memory




fork() with Copy on Write

When either process modifies Page 1,
page fault handler allocates new page
and updates PTE in child process


Parent process's
page table



Physical Memory



Protection bits set to prevent either
process from writing to any page



Child process's
page table


Simplifying Linking and Loading

- Linking

- ◆ Each program has similar virtual address space
- ◆ Code, stack, and shared libraries always start at the same address

- Loading


- ◆ `execve()` allocates virtual pages for `.text` and `.data` sections = creates PTEs marked as invalid
- ◆ The `.text` and `.data` sections are copied, page by page, on demand by the virtual memory system



Mapped Files

- Mapped files enable processes to do file I/O using loads and stores
 - ◆ Instead of “open, read into buffer, operate on buffer, ...”
- Bind a file to a virtual memory region (mmap() in Unix)
 - ◆ PTEs map virtual addresses to physical frames holding file data
 - ◆ Virtual address $\text{base} + N$ refers to offset N in file
- Initially, all pages mapped to file are invalid
 - ◆ OS reads a page from file when invalid page is accessed
 - » How?

Memory-Mapped Files



What happens if we unmap the memory?


How do we know whether we need to write changes back to file?

Writing Back to File

- OS writes a page to file when evicted, or region unmapped
- **Dirty bit** trick (not protection bits)
 - ◆ If page is not dirty (has not been written to), no write needed


Page Hit

- **Page hit:** reference to VM word that is in physical memory (DRAM cache hit)




Page Fault

- **Page fault:** reference to VM word that is not in physical memory (DRAM cache miss)



On-demand Mapping

- Allocate physical page
- Fix the page table
- Resume execution



How do we know whether the fault is fixable?

On-demand Mapping

- When the process calls `mmap ()`, the kernel remembers
 - ◆ The region `[addr, addr+length]`
 - » What virtual addresses are valid/mapped
 - ◆ The backing: just memory (ANONYMOUS) or file
- During page fault handling, the kernel checks
 - ◆ If the faulty virtual address is valid
 - ◆ If so, fix based on the backing

Memory Protection

- R/W (read-only or writable)
 - ◆ We've seen how it is used in CoW
 - ◆ It is also important in preventing attacks (e.g., mark code as read-only so attackers cannot modify them)
- U/S (user or kernel)
 - ◆ How do we protect the kernel? Give it a different address space?
 - » Too expensive for context switch during system calls
 - » May not be a bad idea if security is a concern (recent Meltdown attack)

Memory Protection (2)*

- U/S
 - ◆ Besides protecting the kernel from directly accessed from user space, this bit is also used to prevent kernel from executing wrong code or access wrong data, **why?**
 - » Attackers can attack the kernel and try to execute user space code under kernel context (privilege)
- XD (executable or not)
 - ◆ In the old days there's an attack technique called “**code injection**” where attacker force the CPU to interpret data as code
 - ◆ XD is a response to such attacks by marking data pages as not executable