


**CS 153**  
**Design of Operating  
Systems**

**Winter 2016**

**Lecture 24: Android OS**

# OS Abstractions

---



# Smartphones

---




# ...in 2015

---

## 2015 Market Share\*

■ Android ■ BlackBerry OS ■ Symbian ■ iOS ■ Windows Phone 7/Windows Mobile ■ Others



\* Data provided by IDC Worldwide

---

**What is the difference between a mobile OS and a desktop/server OS?**

# Differences

---

- Size / form-factor
  - ◆ UI system design?
- Resource-constrained (e.g., battery, memory)
  - ◆ Optimized OS (**what would you do?**)
- Cellular and other hardware components
- User has no root access
  - ◆ Unless OS has vulnerabilities and get compromised
- Security threats
  - ◆ App is fully sandboxed and cannot easily attack other apps

# Android

---



# Based on Linux


---

- \* Linux on ARM
- \* Drivers and architecture support
  - \* How to port Android to a new device?
- \* Using Linux vs. Writing a new OS from scratch?
  - \* Do all Linux kernel implementations work well on mobile devices?




# Android

---



# Android



# Android



# Differences

---

- Size / form-factor
- Resource-constrained (e.g., battery, memory)
  - ◆ Optimized OS (**what would you do?**)
- Cellular and other hardware components
- User has no root access
  - ◆ Unless OS has vulnerabilities
- Security threats
  - ◆ Malware is fully sandboxed and cannot easily attack other apps

# Resource-constrained devices

---

- How would you optimize the OS in the following aspects?
  - ◆ Scheduling
    - » Hint: priority
  - ◆ Memory management
    - » Hint: memory pressure
  - ◆ File systems
    - » Hint: access control
  - ◆ Others?

# Offloading of Computation

---

- \* Naive offloading
  - \* Speech-to-text, OCR, Apple's Siri
- \* More sophisticated offloading - fine-grained offloading
  - \* MAUI: Making Smartphones Last Longer with Code Offload
  - \* Running two versions of the app on the mobile device and a powerful server
  - \* Decide when/what to offload on the fly



# Differences

---

- Size / form-factor
- Resource-constrained (e.g., battery, memory)
  - ◆ Optimized OS (what would you do?)
- Cellular and other hardware components
- User has no root access
  - ◆ Unless OS has vulnerabilities
- Security threats
  - ◆ Malware is fully sandboxed and cannot easily attack other apps

# Disk I/O

---

	Flash	Hard Disk Drive
Random access	~0.1ms	5-10ms
File fragment impact	No	Greatly impacted
Total power	1/2 to 1/3 of HDD	up to 15+ watts
Reliability	Reliable	Less reliable due to mechanical parts
Write longevity	Limited number of writes	Less of a problem
Capacity	<= 1TB	4TB
Price	\$0.4 / GB	\$0.04 / GB



# New Capabilities

---


- Cellular
  - ◆ Make phone calls
  - ◆ Send/Recv SMS
- GPS
  - ◆ Tracking
- Phone number
  - ◆ Identification
- Application data
  - ◆ Bank account info
- ...
- How to secure them?

# Android Security

---



# Android Sandbox

- UID separation to protect apps from each other




# Android Permission

- Apps need permissions when they attempt to
  - ◆ access sensitive resource *or*
  - ◆ perform sensitive operations



# Permission enforcement



# Permission enforcement (gid)

---

- Enforced in kernel through uid

- Kernel code in `net/ipv4/af_inet.c`:

```
#include <linux/android_aid.h>
static inline int current_has_network(void) {
    return in_egroup_p(AID_INET) ||
           capable(CAP_NET_RAW);
}
```

# Differences

---

- Size / form-factor
- Resource-constrained (e.g., battery, memory)
  - ◆ Optimized OS (what would you do?)
- Cellular and other hardware components
- User has no root access
  - ◆ Unless OS has vulnerabilities
- Security threats
  - ◆ Malware is fully sandboxed and cannot easily attack other apps

# Android Root

---

- No app can run with root privilege in Android
  - ◆ even if the user desires
- Restrictions set by Google, Vendors, and Carriers
  - ◆ Result: bloatware, power inefficiency, lost freedom/functionality, etc.
  
- How do we gain root back?



# Background: Symbolic Link

---

- On most file systems, symbolic link is supported to point to the same file content without having to copy the content
- “In `–s /home/zhiyunq/ /shortcut`”
- `/shortcut` → `/home/zhiyunq`

# File Permission Vulnerabilities

---

- Works on certain Android devices
  - ◆ Customized by vendors such as Motorola or Samsung
- Goal: Write to /data/local.prop
  - ◆ Add line ro.kernel.qemu=1
  - ◆ But permission denied to normal app
- Exploit:
  - ◆ rm /data/local/logs/log.txt (accessible to anyone)
  - ◆ In -s /data/local.prop /data/local/logs/log.txt
  - ◆ What is the vulnerability?

# Summary

---

- Android OS vs. Traditional OS
- Security architecture of Android
- Android root exploit through file permission vulnerability