

Integrating Flexible Support for Security Policies into the Linux Operating System

<http://www.nsa.gov/selinux>

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(Slight modifications by David Martin for 91.562 in red)

Outline

- Motivation and Background
- What SELinux Provides
- SELinux Status and Adoption
- Ongoing and Future Development

Why Secure the Operating System?

- Information attacks don't require a corrupt user.
- Applications can be circumvented.
- Must process in the clear.
- Network is too far.
- Hardware is too close.
- End system security requires a secure OS.
- Secure end-to-end transactions requires secure end systems.

Mandatory Access Control

- MAC : mandatory access control
 - Beware confusion with Media Access Control, Message Authentication Code
- A “missing link” of security in current operating systems.
- Defined by three major properties:
 - Administratively-defined security policy.
 - Control over all subjects (processes) and objects.
 - Decisions based on all security-relevant information.

Discretionary Access Control

- Existing access control mechanism of current OSes.
- Limited to user identity / ownership.
- Vulnerable to malicious or flawed software.
- Subject to every user's discretion (or whim).
- Only distinguishes admin vs. non-admin for users.
- Only supports coarse-grained privileges for programs.
- Unbounded privilege escalation.

What can MAC offer?

- Strong separation of security domains
- System, application, and data integrity
- Ability to limit program privileges
- Processing pipeline guarantees
- Authorization limits for legitimate users

MAC Implementation Issues

- Must overcome limitations of traditional MAC
 - More than just Multi-Level Security / BLP (Bell-LaPadula)
 - MLS/BLP: Strict hierarchy of security labels
Top Secret > Secret > Confidential > Unclassified
 - No reading from higher level, no writing to lower level
- Policy flexibility required
 - One size does not fit all!
- Maximize security transparency
 - Compatibility for applications and existing usage.

Prior Research Prototypes

- Distributed Trusted Mach (DTMach)
 - Outgrowth of TMach and LOCK OSes
 - Integrated flexible MAC framework into Mach OS
- Distributed Trusted Operating System (DTOS)
 - Improved design and implementation in Mach
 - Studies of policies, composability, security, assurability
- Flux Advanced Security Kernel (Flask)
 - Integrated DTOS security architecture into Flux OS
 - Added support for dynamic policies and revocation
 - Basis for SELinux

Decision to move to Linux

- Recognized need to move to a mainstream platform
- Past strategies not producing desired results
- National Security Council interest in Open Source
- Technology transfer opportunities
- Linux chosen as best alternative

SELinux provides Flexible MAC

- Flexible MAC integrated into Linux kernel
- Application of the Flask security architecture
- Integrated into major kernel subsystems
- Provides object class and permission abstractions
- Labels kernel objects with security contexts
 - Both in memory and on file system: processes, IPC mechanisms, and anything accessed through a file descriptor: files, devices, sockets, etc.
- Enforces access decisions on kernel operations
 - Basically, every interesting system call is subject to MAC checks

SELinux Policy Engine

- Referred to as the “security server” due to origins.
- Implements a combination of:
 - Role-Based Access Control
 - Type Enforcement
 - Multi-Level Security (optional)
- Security Policy specified through a set of configuration files.

Type Enforcement

- Domains for processes, types for objects
- Control access to objects (domain-to-type)
- Control process interactions (domain-to-domain)
- Control entry into domains
- Bind domains to code (through types)

Type Enforcement: Rules

- Let sshd bind a TCP socket to the SSH port.
 - allow sshd_t ssh_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
domain object : class permission to grant
- Let sshd read the host private key file.
 - allow sshd_t sshd_key_t:file read;
- Let sshd create its PID file.
 - allow sshd_t var_run_t:dir { search add_name };
 - allow sshd_t sshd_var_run_t:file { create write };
 - type_transition sshd_t var_run_t:file sshd_var_run_t;
domain obj-to-create new-obj-type

Role-Based Access Control

- Roles for processes
- Specifies domains that can be entered by each role
- Specifies roles that are authorized for each user
- Initial domain associated with each user role
- Ease of management of RBAC with fine granularity of TE

SELinux Status

- Initial public release in Dec 2000, regular updates
- Active public mailing list, >900 members
- Motivated development of Linux Security Module (LSM) framework (2001)
 - LSM adopted into Linux 2.5 development series (2002)
 - Provides infrastructure for supporting SELinux
- SELinux adopted into Linux 2.6 stable series (2003)

SELinux Adoption

- Integrated into Red Hat distributions
 - Fedora Core 3 or later
 - Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 (supported product)
- Integrated into Hardened Gentoo for servers
- Partial support in Debian and SuSE
 - requires additional packages available separately
- Foundation for NetTop
- Basis for Trusted Computer Solution's Trusted Linux
- Port exists for FreeBSD 5 (SEBSD)

Ongoing Development

- Enhanced MLS support (TCS, IBM)
- Security-Enhanced X (originally NSA, now TCS)
- Enhanced Audit subsystem (IBM, Red Hat)
- IPSEC integration (IBM)
- Enhanced application integration (Red Hat)
- Policy tools / infrastructure (Tresys, MITRE, IBM)
- Scalability and performance (NEC, Red Hat, IBM)

Future Work

- Integrate SELinux into other userspace object managers.
- Modify other applications to better leverage SELinux.
- Enhance policy tools and infrastructure.
- Integrate with non-MAC policies (e.g. Crypto)
- Enhance revocation support.
- Develop flexible trusted path mechanism.
- Develop NFSv4 support and upstream it.

Questions?

- Download code and documents from <http://www.nsa.gov/selinux>
- Mailing list: Send 'subscribe selinux' to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov
- Contact our team at: selinux-team@tycho.nsa.gov
- Contact me at: sds@tycho.nsa.gov
- SELinux for Distributions: <http://selinux.sourceforge.net>