



Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security

Network and Security Research Center
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Pennsylvania State University, University Park PA

Attacks

*Trent Jaeger
Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Lab
Computer Science and Engineering Department
Pennsylvania State University*

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- Problem – Attacks on software and systems
- Classical attack – Buffer overflow
- Attack: (1) Change control and (2) Run code
- Other forms of attack
- Return-oriented attacks
- Stuxnet

Our Goal

- In this course, we want to develop techniques to detect vulnerabilities and fix them automatically
- What's a vulnerability?
- How to fix them?



- *We will examine the first question today*

Vulnerability

- How do you define computer ‘vulnerability’?



Buffer Overflow

- First and most common way to take control of a process
- Attack code
 - Call the victim with inputs necessary to overflow buffer
 - Overwrites the return address on the stack
- Exploit
 - Jump to attacker chosen code
 - Run that code

Determine what to attack

- Local variable that is a char buffer
 - ▶ Called buf

BEFORE picture of stack

```
0xbfa3b854: 0x3
0xbfa3b855: 0x0
0xbfa3b856: 0x0
0xbfa3b857: 0x0
0xbfa3b858: 0x3
0xbfa3b859: 0x0
0xbfa3b85a: 0x0
0xbfa3b85b: 0x0
0xbfa3b85c: 0x0
0xbfa3b85d: 0x0
0xbfa3b85e: 0x0
0xbfa3b85f: 0x0
0xbfa3b860: 0x0
0xbfa3b861: 0x0
0xbfa3b862: 0x0
0xbfa3b863: 0x0
0xbfa3b864: 0x0
0xbfa3b865: 0x0
0xbfa3b866: 0x0
0xbfa3b867: 0x0
0xbfa3b868: 0xa8
0xbfa3b869: 0xb8
0xbfa3b86a: 0xa3
0xbfa3b86b: 0xbf
0xbfa3b86c: 0x71
0xbfa3b86d: 0x84
0xbfa3b86e: 0x4
0xbfa3b86f: 0x8
0xbfa3b870: 0x3
0xbfa3b871: 0x0
0xbfa3b872: 0x0
0xbfa3b873: 0x0
```

buf

ebp

rtn addr

ct

```
...
printf("BEFORE picture of stack\n");
for ( i=((unsigned) buf-8); i<((unsigned) ((char *)&ct)+8); i++ )
    printf("%p: 0x%x\n", (void *)i, *(unsigned char *) i);

/* run overflow */
for ( i=1; i<tmp; i++ ){
    printf("i = %d; tmp= %d; ct = %d; &tmp = %p\n", i, tmp, ct, (void *)&tmp);
    strcpy(p, inputs[i]);

    /* print stack after the fact */
    printf("AFTER iteration %d\n", i);
    for ( j=((unsigned) buf-8); j<((unsigned) ((char *)&ct)+8); j++ )
        printf("%p: 0x%x\n", (void *)j, *(unsigned char *) j);

    p += strlen(inputs[i]);
    if ( i+1 != tmp )
        *p++ = ' ';
}
printf("buf = %s\n", buf);
printf("victim: %p\n", (void *)&victim);

return 0;
}
```

Configure Attack

- Configure following
 - ▶ Distance to return address from buffer
 - Where to write?
 - ▶ Location of start of attacker's code
 - Where to take control?
 - ▶ What to write on stack
 - How to invoke code (jump-to existing function)?
 - ▶ How to launch the attack
 - How to send the malicious buffer to the victim?

Return Address

- x86 Architecture
 - ▶ Build 32-bit code for Linux environment
- Remember integers are represented in “little endian” format
- Take address 0x8048471
 - ▶ See trace at right

BEFORE picture of stack

0xbfa3b854: 0x3
0xbfa3b855: 0x0
0xbfa3b856: 0x0
0xbfa3b857: 0x0
0xbfa3b858: 0x3
0xbfa3b859: 0x0
0xbfa3b85a: 0x0
0xbfa3b85b: 0x0
0xbfa3b85c: 0x0
0xbfa3b85d: 0x0
0xbfa3b85e: 0x0
0xbfa3b85f: 0x0
0xbfa3b860: 0x0
0xbfa3b861: 0x0
0xbfa3b862: 0x0
0xbfa3b863: 0x0
0xbfa3b864: 0x0
0xbfa3b865: 0x0
0xbfa3b866: 0x0
0xbfa3b867: 0x0
0xbfa3b868: 0xa8
0xbfa3b869: 0xb8
0xbfa3b86a: 0xa3
0xbfa3b86b: 0xbf
0xbfa3b86c: 0x71
0xbfa3b86d: 0x84
0xbfa3b86e: 0x4
0xbfa3b86f: 0x8
0xbfa3b870: 0x3
0xbfa3b871: 0x0
0xbfa3b872: 0x0
0xbfa3b873: 0x0

buf

ebp

rtn addr

ct

Find Return Address Offset

- Build and run victim
 - ‘make victim’
 - ‘./victim foo bar’
- Find buffer address
 - printed at start of victim output

```
In shell
i = 3; inputs = 0xbfa3b944
&main = 0x8048424
&shell = 0x8048648
&inputs[0] = 0xbfa3b944
&buf[0] = 0xbfa3b854
BEFORE picture of stack
```

- To start of return address
 - read from stack
 - 0xbfa3b86c
- How do we know its the rtn_addr?
 - Must be an address in caller (main)

BEFORE picture of stack

```
0xbfa3b854: 0x3
0xbfa3b855: 0x0
0xbfa3b856: 0x0
0xbfa3b857: 0x0
0xbfa3b858: 0x3
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0xbfa3b85e: 0x0
0xbfa3b85f: 0x0
0xbfa3b860: 0x0
0xbfa3b861: 0x0
0xbfa3b862: 0x0
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0xbfa3b86e: 0x4
0xbfa3b86f: 0x8
0xbfa3b870: 0x3
0xbfa3b871: 0x0
0xbfa3b872: 0x0
0xbfa3b873: 0x0
```

buf

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ct

- Run code determined by attacker
- Old way
 - Include attack code in buffer value
 - Prevented by modern defenses: NX and randomized stack base
- Modern way
 - Return-to-libc attack
 - Configure the stack to run code in the victim's address space

Find Addr to Call Shell Fn

- Jump to location where call to shell function occurs (In main function)
- What address is this at?
 - Need to look at assembly code
- Step 1:
 - Build victim in assembly
 - 'make victim.s'
- Step 2:
 - Insert label before call to shell and rerun
 - 'make victim-label'

Add Label before Call

- In cse544-victim.s

```
main:
    leal    4(%esp), %ecx
    andl    $-16, %esp
    pushl   -4(%ecx)
    pushl   %ebp
    movl    %esp, %ebp
    pushl   %ebx
    pushl   %ecx
    subl    $48, %esp
    movl    %ecx, %ebx
    movl    4(%ebx), %eax
    movl    %eax, 4(%esp)
    movl    (%ebx), %eax
    movl    %eax, (%esp)
    JMP_ADDR:
    call    shell
    movl    $0, 16(%esp)
    movl    $0, 12(%esp)
    movl    -12(%ebp), %eax
    movl    %eax, 8(%esp)
    movl    4(%ebx), %eax
    movl    %eax, 4(%esp)
    movl    (%ebx), %eax
    movl    %eax, (%esp)
    call    victim
```


- (1) Find 'call shell'
- (2) Add 'JMP_ADDR:' to the prior line

Launch Attack

- Execute the victim program with the malicious buffer
 - ▶ From the attack program
 - ▶ Use the *system* system call to involve the exec system call on victim

Anatomy of Control Flow Attacks

- Two steps
- First, the attacker changes the control flow of the program
 - ▶ In buffer overflow, overwrite the return address on the stack
 - ▶ What are the ways that this can be done?
- Second, the attacker uses this change to run code of their choice
 - ▶ In buffer overflow, inject code on stack
 - ▶ What are the ways that this can be done?



Return-oriented Programming

- General approach to control flow attacks
- Demonstrates how general the two steps of a control flow attack can be
- First, change program control flow
 - In any way
- Then, run any code of attackers' choosing, including the code in the existing program

Return-oriented Programming

- ROP slides

- Stuxnet slides

Summary

- The types of attacks that we must defend against are becoming more complex
- Return-oriented programming shows us that *any* attacker-dictated change in program control flow can lead to arbitrary malice
- Stuxnet shows that ad hoc system defenses can be evaded by an adversary
- We must apply principled approaches to defense to make significant strides in defense