

Tractable Constraints in Finite Semilattices

Jakob Rehof, Torben Mogensen

Presented by Divya Muthukumaran

Constraint Satisfaction Problem

- Constraint Satisfaction Problem(CSP) Instance:
 - \mathcal{N} : Finite set of variables; e.g. $\{a,b,c,d\}$
 - \mathcal{D} : Domain of values; e.g. $\{0,1\}$
 - \mathcal{C} : Set of constraints
 - $\{C(S_1), C(S_2), \dots, C(S_c)\}$,
 - S_i : Ordered subset of \mathcal{N} ; e.g. $\{a,b,c\}$
 - $C(S_i)$: Mutually compatible values for variables in S_i
- **Solution to CSP**: Assignment of values to variables in \mathcal{N} , consistent with all constraints in \mathcal{C}

Example

- Assignment of values to variables $N=\{a,b,c,d\}$
- $C=\{C_0, C_1, C_2, C_3\}$
 - $C_0 = \{(1,1,1,1), (1,0,1,1), (0,1,1,0), (1,0,1,0)\}$
 - $C_1 = \{(0,1,1,0), (1,0,0,1), (1,0,1,0), (1,0,1,1)\}$
 - $C_2 = \{(1,1,1,1), (1,1,1,0), (0,1,1,1), (1,0,1,0)\}$
 - $C_3 = \{(1,0,0,1), (1,0,1,0), (1,0,1,1), (0,1,1,1)\}$

Tractability of the CSP

- [[Mackworth77](#)] CSP is NP-Complete.
- In practice, problems have special properties
 - Allow them to be solved efficiently
- [Tractable](#): A CSP is tractable if there is a PTIME solution to it.
- Identifying [restrictions](#) to the general problem that ensures tractability
 - Structure of Constraints
 - Nature of Constraints
 - Restrictions on domains

Quest for tractability

- [Schaefer78] Studied the CSP problem for Boolean variables
 - States the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a set S of Boolean relations yield polynomial-time problems when the relations of S are used to constrain some of the propositional variables.
 - Identified four classes of sets of Boolean relations for which CSP is in P and proves that all other sets of relations generate an NP-complete problem.
- [Jeavons95] Generalization of Schaefer's results
 - Identified four classes of tractable constraints, ensuring tractability in whatever way these classes were combined
 - All of them were characterized by a simple algebraic closure condition
 - Tractability is very closely linked to algebraic properties

Jeavons' Classification

- **Class 0:** Any set of constraints, allows some constant value d to be assigned to every variable.
- **Class I:** Any set of binary constraints which are 0/1/all.
- **Class II:** Any set of constraints on ordered domains, each constraint is closed under an ACI operation.
- **Class III:** Any set of constraints in which each constraint corresponds to a set of linear equations.

Tractable constraints in a POSET

- [Pratt-Tiuryn96]
 - The structure of posets are important for tractability
 - Some structures are intractable – Example: Crowns
- [Rehof-Mogensen99]
 - Tractable constraints in finite semi-lattices
 - Shows how to solve certain classes of constraints over finite domains efficiently
 - Characterize those that are not tractable
 - Can help programmers identify when an analysis

Tractable constraints in Finite Semilattices

- Deals with **Definite Inequalities**:
 - Evolved from the notion of Horn clauses
 - Two point Boolean lattices -> **arbitrary finite semi-lattices**
- Developed an **algorithm 'D'** with properties
 - Algorithm runs in **linear time** for any fixed finite semilattice
 - Can serve as a general-purpose off-the-shelf solver for a whole range of program analyses

Only Definite Constraints?

- The algorithm only applies to definite constraints
- Can other constraints be transformed into definite constraints ?
- If yes, then
 - What is the cost of this transformation?

Monotone Function Problem

- P : Poset
- F : Finite set of monotone functions f with arity a^f .
- $\phi = (P, F)$ is a monotone function problem
- T_ϕ : Is the set of ϕ terms of range,
 - $T_\phi ::= \alpha \mid c \mid f(T_1, \dots, T_{a^f})$
- A – Collection of constants and variables
- $\rho : V \rightarrow P$,
 - ρ : Valuation of all variables
 - $\rho(\alpha)$: value assigned to α

Constraint Satisfiability

- **Constraint Set C over ϕ**
 - Set of inequalities $\tau \leq \tau' \mid \tau, \tau' \in T_\phi$
- ρ is a valuation of C in P
 - $\rho \in P^m$, satisfies C iff the constraint holds under the valuation
 - $\rho(\tau) \leq \rho(\tau')$ holds for every $\tau \leq \tau'$ in C
 - C is satisfiable only if there is a $\rho \in P^m$ that satisfies C
 - ϕ -SAT : Given C over ϕ , is C satisfiable?

More Definitions....

- **Definite Constraint Set:**
 - A constraint set in which every inequality is of the form $\tau \leq A$
 - $C = \{\tau_i \leq A_i\}$ can be written $C = C_{\text{var}} \cup C_{\text{cnst.}}$
- **Simple terms**
 - Has no nested function applications
- **L-Normalization :**
 - $C' \cup \{f(..g(\tau)) \leq A\} \rightarrow_L C' \cup \{f(...v_m...) \leq A, g(\tau) \leq v_m\}$
 - Monotonicity guarantees that this is equivalent to the original constraint set

- $\rho(\beta) = \perp$ for all $\beta \in V$
- $WL = \{\tau \leq \beta \mid L, \rho \text{ does not entail } \tau \leq \beta\}$
- While $WL \neq \emptyset$
 - $\tau \leq \beta = \text{POP}(WL)$
 - If L, ρ does not entail $\tau \leq \beta$
 - $\rho(\beta) = \rho(\beta) \vee \rho(\tau)$
 - For each $\tau' \leq \alpha \in C$ with $\beta \in \text{Vars}(\tau')$
 - $WL = WL \cup \{\tau' \leq \alpha\}$
- For each $\tau \leq L \in C$
 - If L, ρ does not entail $\tau \leq L$
 - raise exception
- return ρ

- $\rho(\beta) = \perp$ for all $\beta \in V$
- $WL = \{\tau \leq \beta \mid L, \rho \text{ does not entail } \tau \leq \beta\}$
- While $WL \neq \emptyset$
 - $\tau \leq \beta = \text{POP}(WL)$
 - If L, ρ does not entail $\tau \leq \beta$
 - $\rho(\beta) = \rho(\beta) \vee \rho(\tau)$
 - For each $\tau' \leq \alpha \in C$ with $\beta \in \text{Vars}(\tau')$ | ρ does not entail $\tau \leq \beta$
 - $WL = WL \cup \{\tau' \leq \alpha\}$
- For each $\tau \leq c \in C$
 - If L, ρ does not entail $\tau \leq c$
 - raise exception
- return ρ

Valuation of β increases strictly in the order of L .
 L has finite height.
Therefore termination follows.

RM Example

- $C = \{L_1 \leq \beta_0, L_2 \wedge \beta_0 \leq \beta_1, \beta_0 \wedge \beta_1 \leq \beta_2\}$
- $\beta_0 = \perp \quad \beta_1 = \perp \quad \beta_2 = \perp$
 - $L_1 \leq \beta_0 \Rightarrow \beta_0 = L_1$
- $\beta_0 = L_1 \quad \beta_1 = \perp \quad \beta_2 = \perp$
 - $L_2 \wedge \beta_0 \leq \beta_1 \Rightarrow \beta_1 = L_1 \wedge L_2$
- $\beta_0 = L_1 \quad \beta_1 = L_1 \wedge L_2 \quad \beta_2 = \perp$
 - $\beta_0 \wedge \beta_1 \leq \beta_2 \Rightarrow \beta_2 = L_1 \wedge L_2$
- $\beta_0 = L_1 \quad \beta_1 = L_1 \wedge L_2 \quad \beta_2 = L_1 \wedge L_2$

- $\rho(\beta) = \perp$ for all $\beta \in V$
- $WL = \{\tau \leq \beta \mid L, \rho \text{ does not entail } \tau \leq \beta\}$
- While $WL \neq \emptyset$
 - $\tau \leq \beta = \text{POP}(WL)$
 - If L, ρ does not entail $\tau \leq \beta$
 - $\rho(\beta) = \rho(\beta) \vee \rho(\tau)$
 - For each $\tau' \leq \alpha \in C$ with $\beta \in \text{Vars}(\tau')$
 - $WL = WL \cup \{\tau' \leq \alpha\}$
- For each $\tau \leq c \in C$
 - If L, ρ does not entail $\tau \leq c$
 - raise exception
- return ρ

*Valuation at β strictly increases
It can only increase till $h(L)$
Total number of constraints added to
WL each time bounded by $|C|$
Total checks done is bound by $h(L) \cdot |C|$*

Extensions

- To a finite meet-semilattice:
 - Add top element to P
 - If any atom is valued at top then FAIL
- Relational constraints (RC):
 - Inequality constraints special case of RC's
 - A RCP is a pair $\Gamma = \{P, S\}$ with P :finite poset, S :finite set of relations over P
 - A RCP is satisfiable if there exists a valuation ρ of C in P s.t. $(\rho(A_1), \dots, \rho(A_{aR})) \in R$ for every $R(A_1, \dots, A_{aR})$

Relational Constraints

- How many relational constraint problems can be efficiently solved using algorithm D?
 - How many problems can be transformed into definite inequality problems and what is the cost of the transformation?
 - Characterize the class of relational problem that can be solved by the algorithm D as follows
 - Let $\Gamma = \{P, S\}$ where P : meet-semilattice, then it can be represented as a definite inequality problem iff Γ is meet-closed.
 - C over Γ can be represented by a definite a simple constraint set C' with $|C'| \leq m(m+2) \cdot |C|$

Boolean Representation

- Translating sets of **definite inequalities** to **propositional formulae**
 - Direct correspondence between solutions to the propositional system and solutions to the lattice inequalities.
- Translation to Boolean constraints will **expand exponentially** in the arity of functions in F
 - This conversion should only be done when the function arities are small.
- Satisfiability of translation: Each constraint in the translation is of the form
 - $a_1 \wedge a_2 \wedge a_3 \wedge \dots a_m \leq a_0$ where a_i are atoms ranging over $\{0,1\}$.
 - Isomorphic to **Horn-clauses**, can be solved in time linear in the size of the constraint set using the algorithm for **HORNSAT**

Extensibility

- Can algorithm be extended to cover more relations than the meet-closed ones?
- Proved that no such extension is possible for any meet-semilattice L
 - “Algorithm D is complete for a maximal tractable class of problems i.e. meet closed ones”

Program flow as constraints

- Check if program enforces information safety.
- Information security policy specified as a lattice.
- Variables in program assigned labels from lattice.
- Generate flow constraints from program.

Program Flow security as Constraints

- *Security enforcing compilers* verify that a program correctly enforces a security policy.

Program Flow security as Constraints

- *Security enforcing compilers* verify that a program correctly enforces a security policy.
- Programmer specifies a policy as a *security lattice*.

Program Flow security as Constraints

- *Security enforcing compilers* verify that a program correctly enforces a security policy.
- Programmer specifies a policy as a *security lattice*.
 - Lattice L governs security, contains levels l related by \leq .
 - If $l \leq l'$, then l is allowed to flow to l' .
 - *Information Flow Security*: Information at a level l can only affect information for all l' such that $l \leq l'$.

Program Flow security as Constraints

- *Security enforcing compilers* verify that a program correctly enforces a security policy.
- Programmer specifies a policy as a *security lattice*.
- Compiler performs source code analysis to identify *information flows*.
 - If a flows to b , the constraint $L(a) \leq L(b)$ is generated.
 - Type system for constraints.

Program Flow security as Constraints

- *Security enforcing compilers* verify that a program correctly enforces a security policy.
- Programmer specifies a policy as a *security lattice*.
- Compiler performs source code analysis to identify *information flows*.
- Flags *information flow errors*.
 - There exists a constraint $L(a) \not\leq L(b)$ that is not satisfied.



Program Flow security as Constraints

- Constraint type system:
 - $v=e \iff L(e) \leq L(v)$
- *Method calls:*
 - *Actual Call:* $x(a1, a2, \dots, an)$
 - *Method Signature:* $x(f1, f2, \dots, fn)$
 - $L(ai) \leq L(fi)$ for $1 \leq i \leq n$
- *Similar idea for returns.*

Context sensitivity

Example:

```
int sum(int x, int y) {  
    int z;  
    z=x*y;  
    Return z; }
```

```
int main{  
    int a __secret__, b, c, d, p, q __public__;  
    p=sum(a, b);  
    q=sum(c, d); }
```

Constraints

- $\text{Secret} \leq L(a)$
- $L(a) \leq L(x), L(c) \leq L(x)$
- $L(b) \leq L(y), L(d) \leq L(y)$
- $L(x) \leq L(z), L(y) \leq L(z)$
- $L(z) \leq L(p), L(z) \leq L(q)$
- $L(q) \leq \text{Public}$

- Constraints will fail if contexts are not separated.

Context sensitivity

Example:

```
int sum(int x, int y) {  
  int z;  
  z=x*y;  
  Return z; }
```

```
int main{  
  int a __secret__, b, c, d, p, q __public__;  
  p=sum(a, b);  
  q=sum(c, d); }
```

- Constraints will not fail; valuation exists.

Constraints

- $\text{Secret} \leq L(a)$
- $L(a) \leq L(x_1), L(c) \leq L(x_2)$
- $L(b) \leq L(y_1), L(d) \leq L(y_2)$
- $L(x_1) \leq L(z_1), L(y_1) \leq L(z_1)$
- $L(x_2) \leq L(z_2), L(y_2) \leq L(z_2)$
- $L(z_1) \leq L(p), L(z_2) \leq L(q)$
- $L(q) \leq \text{Public}$