



Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security

Network and Security Research Center
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Pennsylvania State University, University Park PA

CMPSC 447 ***Type Errors***

Trent Jaeger

*Systems and Internet Infrastructure Security (SIIS) Lab
Computer Science and Engineering Department
Pennsylvania State University*

Type Errors

- Errors that permit access to memory **according to a multiple, incompatible formats**
 - These are called type errors
 - Access outside the expected “type”
- Most of these errors are permitted by simple programming flaws
 - Of the sort that you are not taught to avoid
 - Let’s see how such errors can be avoided
- Some of the changes are rather simple

Temporal Errors

- A few of the exploits that we have discussed are the result of temporal errors



Type Confusion

- Many effective attacks exploit data of another type

```
struct A {  
    struct C *c;  
    char buffer[40];  
};
```

```
struct B {  
    int B1;  
    int B2;  
    char info[32];  
};
```

Type Confusion

- Adversary can abuse ambiguity to control writes

```
struct A {  
    struct C *c;  
    char buffer[40];  
};
```

```
struct B {  
    int B1;  
    int B2;  
    char info[32];  
};
```

```
x = (struct A *)malloc(sizeof(struct A));  
y = (struct B *)x;  
y->B1 = adversary-controlled-value;  
x->c->field = adversary-controlled-value-also;
```

Type Confusion

- Adversary can abuse ambiguity to control writes

```
struct A {  
    struct C *c;  
    char buffer[40];  
};
```

```
struct B {  
    int B1;  
    int B2;  
    char info[32];  
};
```

```
x = (struct A *)malloc(sizeof(struct A));  
y = (struct B *)x;  
y->B1 = adversary-controlled-value;  
x->c->field = adversary-controlled-value-also;
```

- **Arbitrary Write Primitive!**
 - Adversary controls the **value to write** and the **location of the write**
 - Allow adversary to write an arbitrary value to an arbitrary location

What Is Going Wrong?

- We have objects (memory regions) and references (pointers)
 - ▶ What goes wrong in type errors?



How Do Type Casts Work?

- We have **objects** (memory regions) and **references** (pointers)
 - What goes wrong in temporal errors?
- A pointer may **reference a memory region using two different types (i.e., memory formats)**
- Normal lifecycle between a pointer and object
 - `t1 *p, t2 *q;` // declare pointers
 - `p = (t1 *) malloc(sizeof(t1));` // allocate object and define p
 - `p→field = value;` // use pointer for t1
 - `q = (t2 *)p;` // type cast and define q
 - `q→X = value2;` // use pointer for t2

How Do Type Casts Work?

- We have **objects** (memory regions) and **references** (pointers)
 - What goes wrong in temporal errors?
- A pointer may **reference a memory region using two different types (i.e., memory formats)**
- Normal lifecycle between a pointer and object
 - `t1 *p, t2 *q;` // declare pointers
 - `p = (t1 *) malloc(sizeof(t1));` // allocate object and **define** p
 - `p→field = value;` // **use** pointer for t1
 - `q = (t2 *)p;` // type cast and define q
 - `q→X = value2;` // use pointer for t2

How Do Type Casts Work?

- We have **objects** (memory regions) and **references** (pointers)
 - What goes wrong in temporal errors?
- A pointer may **reference a memory region using two different types (i.e., memory formats)**
- Normal lifecycle between a pointer and object
 - `t1 *p, t2 *q;` // declare pointers
 - `p = (t1 *) malloc(sizeof(t1));` // allocate object and define p
 - `p→field = value;` // use pointer for t1
 - `q = (t2 *)p;` // **type cast** and **define** q
 - `q→X = value2;` // **use** pointer for t2

What Can Go Wrong?

- A pointer may **reference a memory region using two different types (i.e., memory formats)**
- Normal lifecycle between a pointer and object
 - ▶ `t1 *p, t2 *q;` // declare pointers
 - ▶ `p = (t1 *) malloc(sizeof(t1));` // allocate object and define p
 - ▶ `p→field = value;` // use pointer for t1
 - ▶ `q = (t2 *)p;` // type cast and define q
 - ▶ `q→X = value2;` // use pointer for t2
- Semantics of "p→field" may be different than "q→X"
 - ▶ Even if these reference the **same memory location**

What Can Go Wrong?


- **Downcasts** – Cast to a larger type; causes overflow
 - ▶ `t1 *p, t2 *q;` // declare pointers
 - ▶ `p = (t1 *) malloc(sizeof (t1));` // allocate t1 object, define p
 - ▶ `p->field = value;` // suppose this is an int field
 - ▶ `q = (t2 *)p;` // **downcast, t2 is a larger type**
 - ▶ `q->extra = value2;` // **overflow memory of object**
- E.g., **t2 is a child type of t1**
 - ▶ So, the size of type t2 is greater than the size of type t1
 - ▶ “extra” field is added to the type t1 to create type t2

What Can Go Wrong?

- **Downcasts** – Cast to a larger type; causes overflow
 - ▶ `t1 *p, t2 *q;` // declare pointers
 - ▶ `p = (t1 *) malloc(sizeof (t1));` // allocate t1 object, define p
 - ▶ `p->field = value;` // suppose this is an int field
 - ▶ `q = (t2 *)p;` // **down cast, t2 is a larger type**
 - ▶ `q->extra = value2;` // **overflow memory of object**
- By downcasting to the larger type t2 with the “extra” field, gives the adversary the ability to read/write beyond the memory region allocated
 - ▶ Memory region is the “sizeof(t1)” in size

Exploiting Type Errors

- Type t2 is a child type (downcast) of type t1



- Allocate object of type t1 and assign “p” to reference

Exploiting Type Errors

- Type t2 is a child type (downcast) of type t1



- Assign "q" of type t2 to the memory location of "p"
 - But, "q" of type t2 thinks it is referencing a larger region

Exploiting Type Errors

- Type t2 is a child type (downcast) of type t1

“p”

Int F1	Int F2	Int F3	
-----------	-----------	-----------	--

“q”

Int F1	Int F2	Int F3	Int extra	
-----------	-----------	-----------	--------------	--

- What will happen when the program accesses “q→extra”?

What Can Go Wrong?


- **Type confusion** – use data to craft a pointer
 - ▶ `t1 *p, t2 *q;` // declare pointers
 - ▶ `p = (t1 *) malloc(sizeof(t1));` // allocate object and define p
 - ▶ `p→field = value;` // suppose “field” is an int field
 - ▶ `q = (t2 *)p;` // type cast and define q
 - ▶ `q→X→target = value2;` // suppose “X” is a pointer field
- “p→field” is a data field, so may store adversary data
- But, “q→X” is a pointer field
 - ▶ Should we allow adversaries to define pointer values?

What Can Go Wrong?

- **Type confusion** – use an integer to craft a pointer
 - ▶ `t1 *p, t2 *q;` // declare pointers
 - ▶ `p = (t1 *) malloc(sizeof(t1));` // allocate object and define p
 - ▶ `p→field = value;` // suppose “field” is an int field
 - ▶ `q = (t2 *)p;` // type cast and define q
 - ▶ `q→X→target = value2;` // suppose “X” is a pointer field
- The write to “field” of type “p” gives the adversary the ability to choose a memory location for the write to “X” – if at the same offset as “field”
 - ▶ To modify an adversary-chosen memory location
 - ▶ Relative to the field “target”

Exploiting Type Errors


- Type t2 is unrelated to type t1



- Allocate object of type t1 and assign “p” to reference

Exploiting Type Errors


- Type t2 is unrelated to type t1



- The **offset** of “Field” from “p” of type t1 and “X” from “q” of type t2 are the same

Exploiting Type Errors



- Type t2 is unrelated to type t1



- Assign an adversary-controlled value at “p→Field”

Exploiting Type Errors


- Type t2 is unrelated to type t1



- But, program accesses “q→X” as a pointer
 - ▶ What can an adversary do?

Exploiting Type Errors

- Type t2 is unrelated to type t1




- But, program accesses "q→X" as a pointer
 - Adversary chose the address stored at "q→X"
 - Thus, the adversary can choose the memory to access

Exploiting Type Errors

- Project 2
 - ▶ What **object** can be accessed by **pointers of multiple types**?
 - ▶ Is there a **flaw** that allows you to create an **object** of one type ...
 - ▶ And access that **object** with a **pointer of a different type**?
 - ▶ Can you find a **target** that you can modify using the mismatched type's pointer?
 - ▶ What do you want to **exploit** if you can modify the target?
 - ▶ Craft the **payload** to cause a modification that implements the desired exploit

Exploiting Type+Temporal Errors

- With temporal errors



- Can also exploit type confusion using temporal errors, such as **use-after-free**
 - ▶ Obj B of type B is deallocated, but has a stale pointer “b”
 - ▶ Obj D of a different type D is allocated in that free slot
 - ▶ Then, a use-after-free flaw can use “b” of type B to access Obj D of a different type D

Integer Overflows

- Yet, **another issue** (probably the last one) to consider
 - ▶ NOTE: Very different from buffer overflows
- Key question
 - ▶ What is an **integer**?
 - ▶ In a computer system?

Integer Overflows

- Yet, **another issue** (probably the last one) to consider
 - NOTE: Very different from buffer overflows
- Key question
 - What is an **integer**?
 - In a computer system?
- There are several different computer representations for integers
 - **Size** – number of bytes used to represent
 - **Signedness** – range of values integers can take

Integer Overflows

- Suppose we have an 8-bit integer type
 - ▶ How many values can it represent?
 - ▶ What range of values can it represent?

Integer Overflows

- Suppose we have an 8-bit, signed integer type
 - ▶ How many values can it represent?
 - $2^8 = 256$
 - ▶ What range of values can it represent?
 - Depends on whether it is “signed” or not
 - ▶ What are the range of values if “unsigned”?
 - 0 to 255
 - ▶ What are the range of values if “signed”?
 - -128 to 127

Integer Overflows

- Can you attack this?

```
int x;  
char *buf = ( char * )malloc( 50 );  
x = adversary-controlled-value;  
If ( x < 50 ) {  
    snprintf( buf, x, "%s", adversary-controlled-input );  
}
```

Integer Overflows

- Can you attack this?
 - ▶ Unfortunately, **we can** – snprintf casts to unsigned
 - ▶ **Negative value becomes a large positive value**

```
int x;
```

```
char *buf = ( char * )malloc( 50 );
```

```
x = adversary-controlled-value; // negative value
```

```
If ( x < 50 ) { // passes this condition
```

```
    snprintf( buf, x, "%s", // second arg 'x' to snprintf is unsigned
```

```
        adversary-controlled-input ); // too long input
```

```
}
```

Integer Overflows

- Can you attack this?
 - ▶ Unfortunately, **we can** – have to compute “size” correctly

```
int x;  
char *buf = ( char * )malloc( 50 );  
x = adversary-controlled-value; // negative value  
If ( x < 50 ) { // passes this condition  
    snprintf( buf, x, “%s”, // ‘x’ becomes a large positive value - overflow  
               adversary-controlled-input ); // too long input  
}
```


Fundamental Problem?

- What is the **fundamental problem** that causes type errors?



Fundamental Problem?

- What is the **fundamental problem** that causes type errors?
 - ▶ **Type casting** – create pointer of different type
 - ▶ **Temporal errors** – change type of memory region
- These enable the **same memory region to be referenced as multiple types**
 - ▶ Enabling exploitable type errors
- Resulting exploitable flaws
 - ▶ Misinterpret the size of the region (downcast)
 - ▶ Data misinterpreted as a pointer (type confusion)
 - ▶ Data values misinterpreted (integer overflow)

Safety from Type Errors

- **Type safety**
 - ▶ Memory region is only referenced by pointers of one type
 - ▶ Corresponding to the type of the memory region allocation
- **Memory safety** (for regions of multiple types)
 - ▶ Memory region may be referenced by pointers of more than one type
 - ▶ Semantics of all references correspond to allocation and consistent use of the memory region
 - ▶ Think about “**question**” types in the project

Obvious Solution in C

- So, do you see an “obvious” solution to prevent exploitable type errors?



Obvious Solution in C

- So, do you see an “obvious” solution to prevent exploitable temporal errors?
 - ▶ No type casts? May be hard to ensure that




Obvious Solution in C

- So, do you see an “obvious” solution to prevent exploitable temporal errors?
 - ▶ What can we do to prevent the misinterpretation of data even if we allow type casts?



- Only allow “**upcasts**” for type casts
 - ▶ A “**downcast**” from a parent data type to a child data type
 - Adds more fields – may allow overflow
 - ▶ An “**upcast**” from a child data type to a parent data type
 - Reduces fields – **no overflow possible, fields are same type**



- Can you think of any other ways to prevent type error exploits?
 - ▶ May be **a little crazy**

- **Hypothesis:** Validate type consistency on casts
 - ▶ At runtime – but can be expensive (>100%)
 - ▶ Maybe type casts are not super-common in your program
 - ▶ Prove some type casts are safe statically?
- **Hypothesis:** Use type-specific allocation
 - ▶ Only helps for temporal errors
 - ▶ Unless do validity checks also

Take Away

- Flexible type casting in C **permits type errors**
 - So, type errors have become common, especially now that defenses for spatial errors have improved
- Exploiting type errors involves **exploiting a reference to a memory region interpreted in multiple ways (using multiple types)**
 - Set data value, but use as a pointer
- Preventing type errors is **not so easy** (except upcasts)
 - **And**, a bit more expensive than people will accept yet