Hardware Trojans: Taxonomy and Detection Methods

Julien Francq
julien.francq@cassidian.com

Cassidian CyberSecurity

2014, July the 15th

Outline

The HINT Project

HINT Project Profile

- HINT = Holistic Approaches for Integrity of ICT-Systems
- Project Number: 317930
- Project website: www.hint-project.eu
- Project start: October 1, 2012
- Project duration: 3 years
- Total Costs: €5.103.893
- EC-Contribution: €3.350.000
- Project is co-financed by the European Commission under Seventh Framework Programme

TECHNIKON
CASSIDIAN CYBERSECURITY
cea
ARMINES
infineon
KU LEUVEN
SAFRAN

Missions

- Development of a common framework for system integrity checking
- Use developed technologies on real-time applications
- Prepare adoption by future security evaluation schemes

Motivation

- Authenticity and integrity of hardware components in modern ICT systems
- Security challenged by improving attacks
  Recent trends:
  - Counterfeiting of hardware components
  - "Hardware Trojans": Hidden functions in Integrated Circuits
- HINT proposal:
  Novel technologies to support assurance of genuineness and integrity

Technical Approach

- Holistic Integrity Checking for Components in ICT-Systems



Objectives

- Main objective: Improve security of architectures and platforms based on tamper-resistant integrated circuits
- Development of methods to:
  - Perform at-time-of-use integrated checking of the global integrity of a system for hardware and embedded software
  - Check the "genuineness" of the secure integrated circuits by detecting functional clones or counterfeited circuits
  - Detect the presence of Hardware Trojans
- Main technologies used:
  - Physically Unclonable Functions, enabling to authenticate a hardware component using a physical, intrinsic and unique property of the device
  - Side Channel based analysis to monitor the behaviour of hardware components and to detect changes from their original specifications and implementations

Hardware Trojan (HT)

- Malicious modifications of an Integrated Circuit (IC) during its design flow



Context

- Outsourcing of the fabrication of the ICs
- Difficult to ensure the trust in all the steps of the design flow



Hardware Trojans in Practice

- 2005: US Department of Defense
- 2007: DARPA "Trust in IC Program"
- 2009: "Hot Topic" of CHES conference
- After 2009: other conferences (DATE, HOST, CARDIS, ReConFig, *etc.*)
- [Skorobogatov *et al.*: "Breaktrough Silicon Scanning Discovers Backdoor in Military Chip", CHES 2012]
- [Becker *et al.*: "Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans", CHES 2013]
- Research projects like HINT (European funded)
- $\Rightarrow$ HTs: real and emerging threat

Possible Payloads

- Kill switch
  - Fighters
- Dysfonctional circuit
  - Satellite which works only 6 months
- Secret information leakage
  - Ciphered communications
- Help a malware by providing a backdoor
  - Privilege escalation, automatic login, password theft
- Prevent from going to sleep mode
  - Autonomy
- *etc.*

Hardware Trojan Taxonomy

- Taxonomy: tree where each branch defines a different property
- In the ideal case, a specific HT must be on only one leaf of the tree

Benefits of the taxonomy

- Systematic study of their characteristics
- Specific detection methods for each HT class
- Benchmark circuits for each class

- Best existing taxonomy: Trust-Hub

Trust-Hub Taxonomy



Factoring the Taxonomy

- 4 (effects) $\times$ 5 (locations) $\times$ 5 (insertion phases) $\times$ 6 (abstraction levels) $\times$ 5 (activation mechanisms) $=$ 3000 different HTs!
- Very rich taxonomy!
- Impossible to implement them all, and then detect them
- $\Rightarrow$ Factoring this taxonomy
- Total: $\sim$ 100 HTs

HT Detection Methods Overview



- No method is 100% successfull!

Detect HTs? Not so easy...

1. Systems on Chip are more and more complex, and detecting a small malicious modification is difficult
2. Reverse-engineering inspection is costly and difficult
   - No guarantee that the remaining ICs are HT-free
3. By nature, HTs are designed to be stealthy
   - Not easily detectable with conventional logic testing
4. By nature, HTs are small to be not easily detected by optical analysis
   - Difficult to detect them with side-channel (power consumption, electromagnetic radiations, *etc.*) analysis

Test Generation (1/2)

- Conventional logic testing cannot be used to reliably detect HT
- Manufacturing defects (stuck-at-faults) $\neq$ HT effects
- Difficult to trigger a HT
  - *Time-bombs*
- Some HTs have no impact on functional outputs (*Trojan Side-Channels*)
- Vast spectrum of possible HTs

Test Generation (2/2)



- HTs are on low controllability and observability nodes for a rare triggering
- Extremely challenging to exhaustively generate test vectors for triggering a HT

Deterministic *vs.* Probabilistic Approach

- Deterministic approach difficult
  - Many possible HTs
  - Function of some IC nodes
  - $\Rightarrow$ Exhaustive enumeration impossible
- Statistic approach :
  1. Find rare events in the circuit
  2. Get a list of HTs which can be inserted
  3. Generate test vectors and estimate their coverage
  4. $\Rightarrow$ Set of high quality test vectors
- 85% reduction in testset length compared to a random approach, but less efficient with big triggers and takes a long time

Side-Channel Analysis

- Any HT in the IC should modify its leakage current (IDDQ), dynamic power trace (IDDT), path-delay characteristic, ElectroMagnetic (EM) radiation.
- Don't need to trigger a HT for measuring its effects
- Test vectors generation easier than for logic testing
- Needs HT-free circuits
  - Get side-channel measurements and then *reverse-engineering* to check if the IC is HT-free
- If so, the measurements become a reference, and we can then compare the side-channels of the other circuits

Global Side-Channel Analysis

- Green: RSA signal
- Red: Process noise (offset)
- Black: HT signal (offset)



Local Side-Channel Analysis

- Local Side-Channel Analysis more efficient than global ones
- Needs again HT-free circuits





- Maximize/Minimize the activity of some IC areas

Noise and Sensitivity







Some Subtleties

- Added circuitry for the HT detection must not be infected itself
  - At best, the added circuitry is disabled (*e.g.*, fault countermeasure)
  - At worst, it can be turned into a *backdoor* (*e.g.*, scan chain)
- A HT triggering logic can exploit the "*Test/Scan Enable*" control line to disable itself
- Parametric HTs very difficult to detect

Summary

	Logic testing approach	Side-channel approach
Pros	(a) Effective for small Trojans	(a) Effective for large Trojans
	(b) Robust under process noise	(b) Test generation is easy
Cons	(a) Test generation is complex	(a) Vulnerable to process noise
	(b) Large Trojan detection challenging	(b) Small Trojan detection challenging

- Complementary methods
- Combine test-time and run-time methods
- Modify the IC for assistive and preventive methods
  - $\Rightarrow$ Design for Hardware Trust

Introduction

- To improve HT detection rate, modify the IC
- $\Rightarrow$ Design for Hardware Trust
  - Prevent from the insertion of HT
  - Ease side-channel analysis and logic testing
- 4 main methods:
  - Delay-Based Methods
  - Rare Event Removal
  - Design for Trojan Test
  - Proof-Carrying Hardware
- Run-Time Detection Methods

Run-Time Methods

- Last line of defense
- On-line monitoring of the IC in real-time, for checks:
  - Critical operations,
  - Idle mode,
  - Security policies,
  - Performance or availability of some units,
  - *etc.*
- Costly

Run-Time Methods



- Disable one suspect block or force one operation
- SPN : *Signal Probe Network*
- SM : *Security Monitor* ($\sim$ FSM)
- SECOPRO : *Security and Control Processor*
- Configurations ciphered and stored in secured Flash memory
- Overhead?

Conclusion

- Hardware Trojans are real threats for integrated circuits
- HT taxonomy is very rich
- No HT detection method of the state-of-the-art is 100% successful
- 3 lines of defense:
  - Design for Hardware Trust
  - Test-Time Methods
  - Run-Time Methods
- A European initiative: HINT project
  - Let's talk about it during the coffee breaks!
- Very encouraging first results:
  - Infected benchmark circuits are available
  - Detection with side-channel analysis
  - Internal circuit delays extraction

Thanks! Questions?