

Web Security I: Injection Attacks

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

Slides modified from
Dawn Song and John Mitchell

What is Web?

Web is a platform for deploying applications and sharing information,
portably and securely



client browser



web server



Hypertext Transfer Protocol


HTTP: a common data communication protocol on the web.



Uniform Resource Locator

URL: global identifiers of network-retrievable resources

Example:



HTTP request

Sending commands to the sever side, like system call.

GET: no
side effect
POST:
possible
side effect

Method Path HTTP version Headers


```
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/x-bitmap,
image/jpeg, /*
Accept-Language: en
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: Chrome/21.0.1180.75 (Macintosh;
Intel Mac OS X 10_7_4)
Host: www.safebank.com
Referer: http://www.google.com?q=dingbats
```

Blank line

Data – none for GET

HTTP response

Retrieving results from the server side, like system call returns.



HyperText Markup Language

HTML: a markup language to create structured documents that can embed images, objects, create interactive forms, etc.

```
<html>
  <body>
    <div>foo <a href="http://google.com">Go to Google!</a></div>
    <form>
      <input type="text" /> <input type="radio" />
      <input type="checkbox" />
    </form>
  </body>
</html>
```

Web security: a historical perspective

- Similar to Internet, web is an example of "bolt-on security"
- Originally, the World Wide Web (www) was invented to allow physicists to share their research papers
 - Only textual web pages + links to other pages
 - No security model to speak of

Web security: nowadays

- The web became complex and adversarial quickly
- Web pages become very complex with embedded images, JavaScript, dynamic HTML, AJAX, CSS, frames, audio, video, sensors, VR, ... from different servers
 - Today, a web site is a distributed application
- Web applications also become very diverse, news, shopping, videos, social network, banking, gaming, ...
 - Attackers have various motivations


Desirable security goals

- **Integrity:** malicious websites should not be able to tamper with the integrity of my computer or my information on other web sites
- **Confidentiality:** malicious websites should not be able to learn confidential information from my computer or other web sites
- **Privacy:** malicious websites should not be able to spy on me or my activities online


How these properties can be violated?

- Server side: injection attacks
- Client side: cross-site attacks

Background: how to server web requests



Background: a simple display web app



Background: how php works

```
<? echo system("cat ".$_GET['file']); ?>
```

<? php-code ?>	executes php-code at this point in the document
echo expr:	evaluates expr and embeds in doc
system(call, args)	performs a system call in the working directory
"" , '	String literal. Double-quotes has more possible escaped characters.
.	(dot). Concatenates strings.
_GET['key']	returns <i>value</i> corresponding to the <i>key/value</i> pair sent as extra data in the HTTP GET request

Command injection

```
<? echo system("cat ".$_GET['file']); ?>
```

Q: Assuming the script we've been dealing with (reproduced above) for `http://www.example.net/display.php`. Which one of the following URIs is an attack URI? (Hint: `%3B` -> ";" `%20` -> " " `%2F` -> "/")

- `http://www.example.net/display.php?file=rm`
- `http://www.example.net/display.php?file=rm%20-rf%20%2F%3B`
- `http://www.example.net/display.php?file=notes.txt%3B%20rm%20-rf%20%2F%3B%0A%0A`
- `http://www.example.net/display.php?file=%20%20%20%20%20`

Command injection

```
<? echo system("cat ".$_GET['file']); ?>
```

Q: Assuming the script we've been dealing with (reproduced above) for `http://www.example.net/display.php`. Which one of the following URIs is an attack URI?

- `http://www.example.net/display.php?file=rm`
- `http://www.example.net/display.php?file=rm -rf /;`
- `http://www.example.net/display.php?file=notes.txt; rm -rf /;`
- `http://www.example.net/display.php?file=`

Command injection

```
<? echo system("cat ".$_GET['file']); ?>
```

Q: Assuming the script we've been dealing with (reproduced above) for <http://www.example.net/display.php>. Which one of the following URIs is an attack URI?

- ```
<? echo system("cat rm"); ?>
```
- ```
<? echo system("cat rm -rf /;"); ?>
```
- ```
<? echo system("cat notes.txt; rm -rf /;"); ?>
```
- ```
<? echo system("cat "); ?>
```

Injection

- Injection is a general problem
 - Typically caused when data and code share the same *channel*
 - For example the code is `cat` and the filename the data
 - But ';' allows attacker to start a new command
- Q: does shellcode fall into the same category?

Input validation

- Two forms
 - **Blacklisting**: block known attack values
 - **Whitelisting**: only allow known-good values
- Blacklists are easily bypassed
 - Set of 'attack' inputs is potentially infinite
 - The set can change after you deploy your code
 - Only rely on blacklists as a part of a defense in depth strategy

Blacklist bypass

- Disallow semi-colons -> Use a pipe
- Disallow pipes and semi-colons -> Use the backtick operator to call commands in the arguments
- Disallow pipes, semi-colons, and backtick -> Use the \$ operator which works similar to backtick
- Disallow `rm` -> Use `unlink`
- Disallow `rm`, `unlink` -> Use `cat` to overwrite existing files

Whitelisting

```
<?
if(!preg_match("/^[a-z0-9A-Z.]*$/", $_GET['file'])) {
    echo "The file should be alphanumeric.";
    return;
}
echo system("cat ".$_GET['file']); ?>
```

- Can these input pass?

```
notes.txt
notes.txt; rm -rf /;
security notes.txt
```

Whitelisting

```
<?  
if(!preg_match("/^[a-z0-9A-Z.]*$/", $_GET['file'])) {  
    echo "The file should be alphanumeric."  
    return;  
}  
echo system("cat ".$_GET['file']); ?>
```

- Can these input pass?

notes.txt (YES)

notes.txt; rm -rf /; (NO)

security notes.txt (NO)

Input escaping

```
<?
```

```
#http://www.php.net/manual/en/function.escapeshellarg.php
```

```
echo system("cat ".escapeshellarg($_GET['file']));
```

```
?>
```

“ ***escapeshellarg()*** adds single quotes around a string and quotes/escapes any existing single quotes allowing you to pass a string directly to a shell function and having it be treated as a single safe argument --

<http://www.php.net/manual/en/function.escapeshellarg.php>

Input escaping

<?

#<http://www.php.net/manual/en/function.escapeshellarg.php>

```
echo system("cat ".escapeshellarg($_GET['file']));
```

?>

GET input	Command executed
notes.txt	cat 'notes.txt'
notes.txt; rm -rf /;	cat 'notes.txt rm -rf /;'
mary o'donnel	cat 'mary o'\''donnel'

Use less powerful API

- The `system` command is too powerful
 - Executes the string argument in a new shell
 - If only need to read a file and output it, use simpler API

```
<? echo file_get_contents($_GET['file']); ?>
```

- Similarly, the `proc_open()` API
 - Executes commands and opens files for I/O
 - Can only execute one command at a time

Recap

- Command Injection: a case of injection, a general vulnerability
- Defenses against injection include input validation, input escaping, and use of a less powerful API

SQL injection: background

- SQL: A query language for database, e.g.,
`SELECT` statement `WHERE` clauses
- More information: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SQL>

Running example

Consider a web page that logs in a user by seeing if a user exists with the given username and password.

```
$result = pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE  
                uid = '$_GET['user'].'" AND  
                pwd = '$_GET['pwd'].'"");  
if (pg_query_num($result) > 0) {  
    echo "Success";  
    user_control_panel_redirect();  
}
```

It sees if results exist and if so logs the user in and redirects them to their user control panel.

SQL injection

Q: Which one of the following queries will log you in as admin? (Hint: '--' starts comments)

- a. `http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin&pwd='`
- b. `http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin--&pwd=foo`
- c. `http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin'--&pwd=f`
- d. It is not possible. (None of the above)

SQL injection

```
$result = pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE
                    uid = '". $_GET['user'] ."' AND
                    pwd = '". $_GET['pwd'] ."'");
if (pg_query_num($result) > 0) {
    echo "Success";
    user_control_panel_redirect();
}
```

URI: `http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin'--&pwd=f`

```
pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE
          uid = 'admin'--' AND pwd = 'f'");
pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE
          uid = 'admin'");
```

SQL injection

Q: Under the same premise as before, which URI can delete the users table in the database?

- a. `www.example.net/login.php?user=;DROP TABLE users;--`
- b. `www.example.net/login.php?user=admin%27%3B%20DROP%20TABLE%20users
--%3B&pwd=f`
- c. `www.example.net/login.php?user=admin;%20DROP%20TABLE%20users;%20
--&pwd=f`
- d. It is not possible. (None of the above)

SQL injection

- URI: `www.example.net/login.php?`

`user=admin%27%3B%20DROP%20TABLE%20users--%3B&pwd=f`

- Decoded: `www.example.net/login.php?user=admin'; DROP TABLE users;-&pwd=f`

```
pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE
        uid = 'admin'; DROP TABLE users;--' AND
        pwd = 'f';");
```

```
pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE uid = 'admin';
        DROP TABLE users;");
```


SQL injection

- One of the most exploited vulnerabilities on the web
- Cause of massive data theft
 - 24% of all data stolen in 2010
 - 89% of all data stolen in 2009
- Like command injection, caused when attacker controlled data interpreted as a (SQL) command

Injection defenses

- Input validation
 - Whitelists untrusted inputs to a safe list
- Input escaping
 - Escape untrusted input so it will not be treated as a command
- Use less powerful API
 - Use an API that only does what you want
 - Prefer this over all other options

Input validation for SQL

```
<?  
if(!preg_match("/^[a-z0-9A-Z.]*$/", $_GET['user'])) {  
    echo "Username should be alphanumeric."  
    return;  
}  
// Continue to do login query  
?>
```

- Can these input pass?

```
Pikachu  
Pikachu'; DROP TABLE users--  
O'Donnell
```

Input validation for SQL

```
<?  
if(!preg_match("/^[a-z0-9A-Z.]*$/", $_GET['user'])) {  
    echo "Username should be alphanumeric."  
    return;  
}  
// Continue to do login query  
?>
```

- Can these input pass?

Pikachu (YES)

Pikachu'; DROP TABLE users-- (NO)

O'Donnel (NO, FALSE POSITIVE)

Input validation for SQL

```
pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE  
    uid = '$_GET['user']' AND  
    pwd = '$_GET['pwd']'");
```

Q: Which of the following URIs would still allow you to login as admin?

- a. `http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin&pwd=admin`
- b. `http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin&pwd='%20R%201%3D1;--`
- c. `http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin'--&pwd=f`
- d. `http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin&pwd='--`

Input validation for SQL

```
pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE  
    uid = '$_GET['user']' AND  
    pwd = '$_GET['pwd']'");
```

URI (decoded): `http://www.example.net/login.php?user=admin&pwd=' OR
1=1;--`

```
pg_query("SELECT * from users WHERE uid = 'admin' AND  
    pwd = ' OR 1 = 1;--'");
```

Input escaping

```
$_GET['user'] = pg_escape_string($_GET['user']);  
$_GET['pwd'] = pg_escape_string($_GET['pwd']);
```

“ *`pg_escape_string()` escapes a string for querying the PostgreSQL database. It returns an escaped literal in the PostgreSQL format.*

GET input	Escaped output
Bob	Bob
Bob'; DROP TABLE users; --	Bob''; DROP TABLE users; --
Bob' OR '1'='1	Bob'' OR ''1''=''1

Use less powerful API

- Create a template for SQL Query, in which data values are substituted
- The database ensures untrusted value isn't interpreted as command
- **Always prefer over all other techniques**
- Less powerful:
 - Only allows queries set in templates.

Use less powerful API

<?

```
# The $1 and $2 are a 'hole' or place holder for what will  
# be filled by the data
```

```
$result = pg_query_params('SELECT * FROM users WHERE  
                        uid = $1 AND pwd = $2',  
                        array($_GET['user'], $_GET['pwd']));
```

```
# Compare to
```

```
$result = pg_query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE  
                    uid = '" . $_GET['user'] . "' AND  
                    pwd = '" . $_GET['pwd'] . "'");
```

?>

Recap

- SQL Injection: a case of injection, in database queries
- Extremely common, and pervasively exploited
- Use prepared statements to prevent SQL injection
 - **DO NOT** use escaping, despite what xkcd says