

# CS255: Computer Security

Machine Learning in Security

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# Machine Learning

## Making Decisions without Explicit Instruction

- Task: solving a problem (e.g., classification, regression, decision, etc)
- Approaches
  - Manual programming (e.g., logical rules, heuristics): explicit instructions
  - Classic ML: manually defined feature space, but no explicit instructions
  - Deep learning: self-learned features, no explicit instructions

# Machine Learning

## General Approaches

- Supervised learning: requires labeled training data
  - Self-supervised learning: label can be generated automatically
- Unsupervised learning: no labeled data
- Reinforcement learning: environment and rewards

# Machine Learning in Security

- Security researchers have been using ML for a long time
  - Intrusion detection (1987)
  - Malware classification
  - Bug finding
- But the proposed methods rarely work in practice, **WHY?**

# Outside the Closed World

## On Using Machine Learning For Network Intrusion Detection

- Fundamental challenges in outlier detection
- High cost of errors
- Semantic gap between results and their operational interpretation
- Enormous variability in input data
- Fundamental difficulties for conducting sound evaluation

*The idea of specifying only positive examples and adopting a standing assumption that the rest are negative is called the closed world assumption. . . . [The assumption] is not of much practical use in real- life problems because they rarely involve “closed” worlds in which you can be certain that all cases are covered.*

I. H. Witten and E. Frank, Data Mining: Practical Machine Learning Tools and Techniques (2nd edition). Morgan Kaufmann, 2005.

## **Outlier Detection**

# Outside the Closed World

## Outlier Detection

- Classification can and can be good at detecting **known attacks**
- Classification **cannot** detect **new attacks**
  - Lack of training data
- Anomaly detection does not work in open world
  - High false positives

# Outside the Closed World

## High Cost of Errors

- ML models usually have to trade-off between precision (false positive rate) and recall (false negative rate)
- These errors are usually fine in other ML applications
  - Recommendation systems, OCR (image recognition), spam filter
- But errors in IDS (or system solutions in general) have much higher cost
  - False positives: unusable
  - False negatives: attacks



# Outside the Closed World

## Semantic Gap

- How to interpret the output of a ML model?
  - or How the **features** the anomaly detection system operates on relate to the semantics of the operational environment (e.g., network)?
- This is especially bad for deep learning models
  - Pentagon project from 1980s: a neural network was trained to detect tanks in photos; however, that the datasets used for training and evaluation shared a subtle property: **photos of tanks were taken on a cloudy day, while all others had a blue sky.**

# Outside the Closed World

## Diversity in Input Data

- Raw input data (e.g., network traffic, malware binaries) in cyber space are high-dimensional and heavy-tailed
  - Without understanding/extracting high-level semantics, ML models are likely to pick up superficial or even harmful features
  - It is also easy for attackers to bypass the detection through simple transformations


# Outside the Closed World

## Sound Evaluations

- Realistic dataset is extremely rare
  - Hard to access, usually contains sensitive information (network traffic) or potential harmful activities (malware)
- Semantic gap
- Adversarial settings

# Attacking ML models

## Malicious PDF



# Attacking ML models

## Malware Detection

- Semantic equivalent transformations (metamorphic)
  - Guided by feedback from the model